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SETTLEMENTS AS AN INCENTIVE TO PROCURE
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE CLEANUP:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND A BROAD READING OF
CERCLA §113(F)(3)(B)
Stephen F Soltis'
I. INTRODUCTION
D uring its haste to establish itself as a prominent industrial power,the United States lacked the enforcement power necessary to
protect its environmental assets and natural resources. Industrial centers
were left largely unchecked for the majority of the twentieth century and
the pollutants remaining on these sites produced a lasting negative impact
for generations. The Love Canal is the most famous instance of these
industrial sites polluting without regard for the natural resources
surrounding them. In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to
facilitate the cleanup of these sites.'
There are three provisions in CERCLA that keep the Superfund-a
federal program created to fund the cleanup of hazardous waste-at a
sustainable level. Each provision entails the liability of potentially
responsible parties. First, an action filed pursuant to §107(a) allows an
entity that has incurred response costs consistent with the NCP to sue for
restitution of those costs from potentially responsible partieS2 Next, a §
113(f)(1) action allows a potentially responsible party to sue another party
for contribution, but only if a suit was brought against the first potentially
responsible party.3 Finally, under § 113(f)(3)(B), a potentially responsible
party can settle with the state or federal government. Subsequently, the
* Staff Member, KY.J. EQUINE AGRIC. &NAT. RESOURCES L., 2014-2015; B.A. in Economics
2012, University of Kentucky, J.D. Candidate, expected May 2015, University of Kentucky.
Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009).
2 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (2013).
42 U.S.C. §113(f)(1) (2013).
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settling party can file a contribution suit against other potentially
responsible parties.4
This note addresses the discrepancy between circuits in the timing of a
contribution suit brought under § 113(f)(3)(B) after a potentially
responsible party has settled its state law liability claims. This note will
propose that allowing a potentially responsible party to bring a contribution
suit whenever that party has settled a state or federal liability claim is the
interpretation most consistent with the intent of CERCLA.
First, this note will look at the history and text of CERCLA
provisions that create causes of action for response cost recovery. Moreover,
this note will establish a basic understanding of the current law concerning
contribution actions available to potentially responsible parties as delineated
by circuit court decisions and the United States Supreme Court decision
concerning contribution actions under CERCLA § 107(a).
Second, this note will discuss the friction-creating cases, Consolidated
Edisons and Trinity.' That section will analyze the distinguishing traits of
each case and the reasoning used by the Second Circuit in Consolidated
Edison and by the Third Circuit in Trinity. The note will review how
district courts across the nation apply the Second Circuit's decision in
Consolidated Edison, and the points of disagreement between the district
courts and the Second Circuit.
Following this analysis, this note will propose and support the
conclusion that the Third Circuit's interpretation of § 113(f)(3)(B) is the
most logical and legally sound choice for courts to use in future decisions.
District courts should adopt the Third Circuit's reasoning and allow
potentially responsible parties to seek contribution after settling state law
liability. This rule conforms more closely to the original intent of Congress
in enacting CERCLA, and provides courts and litigants a more definitive
rule to determine liability.
442 U.S.C. §9613(f)(2) (2013).
s Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
6Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013).
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II. POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTY CONTRIBUTION UNDER
CERCLA
There are three provisions that allow a potentially responsible party to
seek contribution under CERCLA: §§ 107(a), 113(f)(1), and 113(f)(3)(B).
A basic understanding of these provisions is necessary to demonstrate
Congressional intent.
Potentially responsible parties filed an enormous amount of suits after
CERCLA was enacted in an attempt to use § 107 to recover response costs
from other parties.7 Often, the potentially responsible parties seeking
contribution had engaged in voluntary cleanup and would file these actions
to recover cleanup costs.' Although the original language of CERCLA did
not mention a right of contribution, a number of courts found federal
common law created an implied right to contribution. ' However, this
stance was controversial at the time because the Supreme Court issued two
decisions stating that federal statutes did not include implied common law
rights to contribution.10
Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) of 1986 with the intent of creating an explicit right for
potentially responsible parties to seek contribution." Prior to the SARA
amendments in 1986, courts used § 107(a)(4)(B) to imply a right of
contribution for private parties.'2 The SARA amendments changed that
position by adding § 113, which explicitly stated that a potentially
responsible party may seek contribution. SARA codified this right of
contribution into CERCLA § 113(f)(1).
' Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004).
8 id.
'Id. at 162 (citing United States v. New Castle Cnty., 642 F.Supp. 1258, 1263-69 (D. Del. 1986)
and Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F.Supp. 1484, 1486-93 (D. Colo. 1985)).
o Id. (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-47 (1981); Nw.
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90-99 (1981)).
SId.
2 Id. at 161.
13 Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 162-63.
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Within the SARA amendments of 1986 was a congressionally created
cause of action allowing potentially responsible parties to seek contribution
under § 113 (f)(1) after the party took action to clean up sites
"contaminated by hazardous substances."' Section 113(f)(1) pertinently
states that, "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section
9607(a)."15
The United States Supreme Court specified in Cooper Industries Inc. v.
Aviall that a potentially responsible party could not seek contribution
under § 113(f)(1) until that party had been sued under § 107(a).' 6 The
litigants in Cooper Industries were two companies that had contaminated
properties in Texas." Aviall Services informed the State of the
contamination'" and voluntarily undertook the cleanup of the sites. Then
Aviall attempted to obtain contribution from Cooper Industries under
CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(1).19 Aviall voluntarily dismissed its §
107(a) claim but continued to seek contribution under § 113(f)(1).20 Justice
Thomas, writing for the Court, dismissed this claim by stating that the
enabling clause of § 113(f)(1) requires that a potentially responsible party
be the subject of to suit before it may seek contribution.2 justice Thomas
reasoned that Congress would not have included the "during or following"
provision in the amendments if it had intended for a potentially
responsible party to be able to file for contribution prior to the initiation of
a cost recovery action against it. 12
Cooper Industries argued that the "saving clause" of § 113(f)(1)
enables a potentially responsible party to bring a contribution claim
11 Id. at 160.
1s42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2013).
16 Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166.
17 Id. at 163.
Is Id. at 164.
19Id
20 Id. at 165.
21 Id. at 164-65.
2 Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166.
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without a suit having been brought against it." The saving clause states,
"[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section
9606 of this title or 9607 of this title."24 The Court concluded that this
saving clause only clarifies that § 113(f)(1) does not interfere with any
other right of contribution not contained in § 113(f)(1). 25 The clause only
"rebuts any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by
the enabling clause is the exclusive cause of action available to a potentially
responsible party."2 6 Justice Thomas continued that the clause itself does
not grant a potentially responsible party a new cause of action existing
outside the scope of§ 113(f)(1). 2
The SARA Amendments also codified in § 113(f)(3)(B) the ability of
a potentially responsible party to settle with the any state or the United
States itself , and then seek contribution from a non-settling party.28
Section 113(f)(3)(B) states that:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States
or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or
all of the costs of such action in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from
any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in [§
113(f)(2)]. 2 9
A potentially responsible party that is attempting to settle and seek
contribution must first ensure that the judiciary or an administrative agency
approves the settlement.o Once approved, these settlements release the
settling party from any future actions for contribution.3' However, parties
23 id.
24 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2013).
25 Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166.
26 Id. at 166-67.
27 Id. at 167.
28 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3)(B) (2013).29 
d.
'o Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 167.
31 42 U.S.C. §113(f)(3)(B).
2014-2015] 147
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 7 No. 1
not involved in the initial settlement are still exposed to contribution
liability.
The three provisions discussed above provide a potentially responsible
party with distinct options in terms of recovering cleanup costs. Section
107(a) creates a right to recover costs in some situations.32 Sections
113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B) allow for a potentially responsible party to seek
contribution after either a civil suit is brought or a settlement is reached,
respectively.3  The Court in Cooper Industries settled that before a §
113(f)(1) claim may be brought, a potentially responsible party must have
been sued under § 107(a).34 However, there exists a conflict among the
federal courts as to when, exactly, a potentially responsible party may bring
an action under § 113(f)(3)(B). 3s The issue in the cases center on whether a
potentially responsible party has to settle CERCLA liability with the
federal government, or whether settling state law liability is sufficient to
create a cause of action for contribution.
III. CASES INVOLVING CERCLA §113(F)(3)(B)
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the §
113(f)(3)(B) question of whether settlement is sufficient to trigger
contribution. This question was left largely unsettled until 2005, when the
Second Circuit addressed the issue head on in Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y, Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc.31 In Consolidated Edison (ConEd), the appellant
ConEd entered into a "Voluntary Cleanup Agreement" (VCA) in an effort
to clean up over 100 sites.37 The appellant filed a cost recovery action under
§ 107(a).3 ' The trial court initially dismissed the claim, and while appeal
was pending, the Supreme Court rendered its Cooper Industries decision.39
32 Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 163.
33id
Id. at 166.
3 See generally Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005);
Trinity Indus. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013).
36 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
3
1 Id. at 93.
38 Id.
31 Id. at 93-94.
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Since the appellant did not bring its action as part of a prior civil suit, it
could not bring the contribution claim under § 113(f)(1). 40
The appellant argued that the VCA qualified as an administrative
settlement and released it from liability under state environmental laws,
and claimed it could seek contribution from other potentially responsible
parties because the VCA met CERCLA's requirements. 42 The Second
Circuit did not accept this interpretation of the statute.43
The court reasoned that § 113(f)(3)(B) creates a right to contribution
only when federal CERCLA liability has been resolved.4 The court
distinguished CERCLA claims from broader categories of claims, and held
that the resolution of liability of these broader state law claims was not
sufficient to create a cause of action for contribution.45 The court focused
on the resolution of liability for response actions as a prerequisite for §
113(f)(3)(B). 46 According to the Second Circuit, response actions are
specific to CERCLA and describe "an action to clean up a site or minimize
the release of contaminants in the future."47 Using this interpretation of
response action costs, the court reasoned that CERCLA must intend that a
potentially responsible party has to settle its CERCLA liability before it can
bring a contribution action.
The court supported this reasoning by reference to the legislative
history behind the SARA amendments. The court noted that Congress did
not intend "to meddle with the contribution rules governing settlement of
non-CERCLA claims."49 Since the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce report sought to clarify that §113 applies only to CERCLA
liability, the court believed that § 113(f)(3)(B) claims could only be brought
4 Id. at 94.
41 Id. at 95.
42 Consol. Edison Co. ofNY, Inc., 423 F.3d at 95.
43 Id. at 97.
4 Id. at 95.
45 id.
"Id. at 95-96.
47 id.
48 Consol. Edison Co. ofN.Y, Inc., 423 F.3d at 95-96.
4 id.
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once CERCLA, rather than state law, liability had been resolved.so Next,
the court turned to the question of whether the appellant had resolved its
CERCLA liability through the Voluntary Cleanup Agreement."
In determining whether the appellant had met this standard, the court
focused on the Voluntary Cleanup Agreement.s2 The VCA, according to
the court, only resolved the appellant's liability to the state.s" The VCA
included an exception that would allow the state to seek CERCLA liability
against Consolidated Edison (Con Ed).54 The VCA was only valid during
the cleanup, and it left open the possibility that the state could seek a
CERCLA claim against Con Ed after the VCA expired.ss The court
reasoned that, because the VCA resolved Con Ed of its state law liability
but made no mention of CERCLA liability release, Con Ed could not
sustain a suit brought under § 113(f)(3)(B).ss
Following Consolidated Edison, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its ruling
regarding § 113(f)(3)(B) in WR. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc.s" In
WR. Grace, the plaintiff, W.R. Grace & Co., brought a contribution action
under §113(f) to recover costs incurred in a response action.ss The Second
Circuit in WR. Grace was dealing with an administrative order on consent
between W.R. Grace and the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC).9 As part of the consent order, W.R Grace was
responsible for repaying roughly $20,000 for response costs incurred by the
state. Also, as part of the consent order, W.R. Grace did not admit to any
liability and secured a release from any claims arising from New York state
law.60
so Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. -- Conn. v. Zotos Int'l., Inc., 98-CV-838S(F), 2005 WL
1076117 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) affd in part, rev'd in part, 559 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009)).
51 1d.
52 id.
53 id.
s Consol. Edison Co. ofN.Y, Inc., 423 F.3d at 96-97.
55 id.
s6 Id. at 97.
s W.R. Grace &Co. -- Conn. v. Zotos Int'l., Inc., 559 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009).
so Id. at 86.
11 Id. at 87.
60Id.
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Once W.R. Grace entered into this consent order with the state, it
filed an action against defendant Zotos under § 113(f) of CERCLA.6'
Discussing W.R. Grace's right to seek contribution from Zotos, the Second
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Consolidated Edison by stating that "only
when liability for CERCLA claims, rather than some broader category of
legal claims, is resolved does section 113(f)(3)(B) create a right to
contribution."62 The court concluded that the consent order did not qualify
as settlement of CERCLA liability.6' The language in the consent order did
not absolve W. R. Grace of its CERCLA liability.64 The DEC was only
settling with W.R. Grace regarding the state law claims that existed against
the company.65
The Second Circuit viewed the consent order in the same manner as it
did the VCA in Consolidated Edison.6 In the Second Circuit's opinion,
neither of these agreements between the respective parties and the states
were sufficient to trigger the right to contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B).
The court in both Consolidated Edison and WR. Grace believed that, because
the settling parties were still subject to potential CERCLA liability, they
were not entitled to bring actions under § 113(f)(3)(B)." Settling with the
state was not sufficient, thus creating an environment where only federal
settlements would suffice to sustain a § 113(f)(3)(B) action."
6 1 Id.at 88.
62 Id. at 90 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
2005)).
61 W.R. Grace & Co. -- Conn., 559 F.3d at 91.64 
Id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 id.
6 WR. Grace & Co., 559 F.3d at 91; Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423
F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2005).
6 WR. Grace & Co., 559 F.3d at 91; Consol. Edison Co. ofN.Y, Inc., 423 F.3d at 95.
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IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON THE DEBATE
Before 2013, district courts typically followed the Second Circuit's
interpretation of § 113(f)(3)(B) .7 However, in 2013, a § 113(f)(3)(B)
action came before the Third Circuit and the Second Circuit's ruling came
under fire.71
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., the Third Circuit
faced a situation very similar to those in Consolidated Edison and WR.
Grace.72 In Trinity, the settling party owned a railcar manufacturing
facility.73 ; Defendant, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., previously owned and
operated that facility.74 During Chicago Bridge's ownership, it constructed
"a facility for the manufacture of steel products such as storage tanks,
pressure vessels, water towers, and bridge components."75 Trinity claimed
that Chicago Bridge qualified as a responsible party for a portion of the
contamination on the site.
The consent order involved in the case established Trinity as a
potentially responsible party for release of hazardous substances at the
cleanup site.77 The court noted that nothing in the order "'shall constitute or
be construed as a release or covenant not to sue' parties not named in the
Consent Order."7 ' Through the consent order, Trinity retained the right to
sue or seek relief from any party not contained in the consent order. 7 This
effectively gave Trinity the right to seek contribution from other potentially
responsible parties after it had settled its liability with the State.
The Third Circuit believed that the release of state law liability
established by the consent order was sufficient to create a cause of action
70 See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., CV 04-2144-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 173662,
at *9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006).
71 See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 135-38 (3d Cir. 2013)
(holding that the owner could seek contribution under CERCLA).
72 See id. at 133.
73 Id.
7 Id. at 134.
n7 Id.
76 Id.
77 Trinit'yIndus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 134
78 Id.
79 Id.
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under § 113(f)(3)(B)." The court held that a settlement of any liability with
the United States or a state for a response action is sufficient to initiate and
maintain a § 113(f)(3)(B) action." The court noted that a response action
and settlement could be initiated under state law in order for a potentially
responsible party to maintain a contribution claim under § 113(f)(3)(B)."
However, the state statutes involved in Trinity Industries were similar
to CERCLA in their liability regimes. The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act (HSCA) closely mirrors CERCLA. HSCA establishes a fund
for cleanup expenditures," establishes classes of responsible parties,84 and
allows for contribution among responsible parties." The court affirmed that
"liability [under CERCLA] is neither greater not lesser under the
HSCA... Indeed, the cost recovery and contribution provisions in HSCA
are virtually identical to those in CERCLA." 6
Since the state statutory framework was similar in structure and
substance to CERCLA, it is logical to assume that a consent order issued
under the substantive law of HSCA would also likely resolve CERCLA
liability. If the consent order is capable of resolving liability under
CERCLA, then it would be a settlement sufficiently releasing the
potentially responsible party of liability such that the party could file and
maintain a § 113(f)(3)(B) claim.
The divergent rules between the Second and Third Circuits create .a
conflict that affects the substantive rights of potentially responsible parties.
Depending on which rule a district court uses in determining the viability
of a § 113(f)(3)(B) claim, the party would either have to settle and resolve
its CERCLA liability with the federal government or state, or resolve its
liability for either state law claims or federal claims. This distinction greatly
s Id. at 136.
st Id. ("The statutory language of § 113(f)(3)(B) requires only the existence of a settlement
resolving liability to the United States or a state 'for some or all of a response action.'").
82 id.
1 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.901 (West 2013).
8 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.701 (West 2013).
8s 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.705 (West 2013).
8 Trinity Indus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 137 (quoting Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp.,
602 F.3d 204,236 (3d Cir. 2010)).
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affects the potentially parties' willingness to settle, and subsequently affects
the ability of state governments to remedy these hazardous sites.
V. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S RULE CORRECTLY ALLOWS FOR STATE LAW
SETTLEMENTS TO TRIGGER A CERCLA CONTRIBUTION ACTION
The key words in § 113(f)(3)(B) are that "[a] person who has resolved
its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response
action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement..."" Accordingly, these qualifiers
demonstrate that the original intent of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 was to allow a wider array of resolutions to
trigger contribution. The Third Circuit correctly held that a settlement of
state law liability is sufficient to trigger a right of contribution; the court
correctly noted that the Second Circuit misinterpreted legislative history,
and the court correctly adopted the rule in Trinity Industries that is in line
with CERCLA's primary goals.
A. Proposalfor a Liberal Reading of§ 113(f)(3)(B)
A liberal reading of § 113(f)(3)(B) would allow states to settle the
liability of potentially responsible parties, thereby providing a more efficient
remedy of hazardous sites. As an incentive for settling with the state and
agreeing to begin cleanup, a potentially responsible party should be able to
seek contribution from other parties once its liability for any response cost
is settled.
The Third Circuit's ruling from Trinity Industries is not limited to
statutes that mirror CERCLA, but applies to all settlements between a state
and potentially responsible party when the party is settling its liability for
response actions. CERCLA's intention for states to quickly provide
response actions to hazardous sites "play[s] a critical role in effectuating the
- 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2013)(emphasis added).
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purposes of CERCLA."" If the states are to achieve their maximum
potential within the CERCLA framework, they must have the power to
incentivize potentially responsible parties. A settlement of the parties' state
law liability is a powerful incentive, especially when that settlement allows
the party to recover some cleanup costs through a contribution action.
B. District Courts Would be Well Served by a Clear Rule that.Allows a
Contribution Action to Commence Upon the Settlement ofany Potentially
Responsible Party Liability
In Cooper, the Supreme Court clarified that in order to maintain a
contribution action, a potentially responsible party must satisfy either §
113(f)(1) or § 113(f)(3)(B)." In Consolidated Edison and its progeny, the
Second Circuit noted that the statutory language of CERCLA §
113(f)(3)(B) requires that a "response action" be commenced prior to a
contribution action being filed.o The Second Circuit reasoned that a
"response action" is a term unique to CERCLA." Therefore, Congress
must have intended for a potentially responsible party to settle costs related
to CERCLA-specific actions before that party could seek contribution
from other parties.
Multiple states, however, have "response actions" written into statutes
similar to CERCLA. These states range from Alaska,92 to New Jersey," to
South Carolina,94 and Kentucky.95 The Third Circuit correctly noted that
Congress could easily write into the statute a provision limiting settlement
to only CERCLA-based claims.96 By leaving this provision out of the
statute, Congress left the ability of potentially responsible parties to settle
" Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 4, Niagara Mohawk v.
Consol. Rail, No. 08-3843-cv; 08-4007-cv (2d Cir. 2009)).
' Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serys., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
* Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2005).
91 Id. at 95-6.
92 ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.825(a) (2013).
91 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1OB-19 (West 2013).
94 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-180(a) (2013).
9s KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.46-580(16) (West 2013).
96 Trinity Indus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 136.
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relatively broad. This runs contrary to the holding of the Second Circuit in
Consolidated Edison and WR. Grace."
District courts largely accepted the Second Circuit's ruling that a
potentially responsible party must specifically resolve CERCLA liability
before filing a contribution claim." That is, district courts allowed a party
to file for contribution only after settling CERCLA liability with a federal
agency.
However, in 2006, the court in the Western District of New York
broke from this trend. Prior to Trinity, the district court in Seneca Meadows,
Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc. distinguished the agreement in that case from
the agreement found in Consolidated Edison and WR. Grace.99 The court in
Seneca Meadows ruled that states can release a potentially responsible party
from CERCLA liability without a clear EPA mandate granting such
authority.'o Acting pursuant to this release authority, New York entered
into a consent order with the party in Seneca Meadows, and the district
court determined that this order was sufficient to trigger a contribution
claim.101
Seneca Meadows is a prime example of why the Third Circuit's rule is
preferable. The court in Seneca Meadows differentiated Consolidated Edison
because the agreement involved in Seneca Meadows between the state and
potentially responsible party resolved CERCLA liability.'02 Adopting the
rule of Trinity Industries allows a potentially responsible party to seek
contribution once it reaches a settlement with a State or federal agency,
would clarify parties' rights and allow parties to accurately and quickly
determine their ability to recoup response costs.
" See W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn v. Zotos Int'l., Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Consol.
Edison Co. ofN.Y, Inc., 423 F.3d at 95).
" See Champion Lab., Inc. v. Metex Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32610, at *20-21 (D.N.J.
Apr. 21, 2008); ASARCO, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2006 WL 173662, at 20-21 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24,
2006).
* Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (W.D.N.Y.
2006).
InId. at 287.
0 Id. at 290-91.
12 Id. at 287.
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Where the Second Circuit and district courts believe that potentially
responsible parties have to settle for CERCLA-specific claims, the
language of the statute leaves open the possibility for parties to resolve their
liability for what the Second Circuit deemed a "broader category of
claims."103 In doing so, Congress made it easier for parties to settle. This
ease in settling equates to a faster contribution action, thereby increasing
the flow of money to remediation of the CERCLA site.
Clearly, a potentially responsible party that settles its liability under
these state laws should be able to seek contribution from other parties that
were responsible for contaminating the site. The prohibition against
broader categories of claims appears to forbid any contribution action if the
only settlement deals with state law claims. This reading is too restrictive,
and the district court in Seneca Meadows was cognizant of the error in this
interpretation. The court in Seneca Meadows recognized that, when state
law settlement is almost identical to settlement with the EPA or federal
government, the potentially responsible party should be able to obtain
contribution for remediation.'04
The court in Trinity adopted this approach by allowing Trinity
Industries to file a contribution claim after settling state liability.' Trinity
settled its liability based upon Pennsylvania statutes that closely mirror
CERCLA.o6 However, courts that do not wish to follow the broader
settlement authority found in Trinity Industries may contend that the state
statute at issue was HSCA, which closely mirrors CERCLA.'0 7  Since
Trinity settled liability identical to the liability found in CERCLA it had,
in essence, settled its CERCLA liability.
Opponents of the Third Circuit's rule would liken this to the
settlement found in Seneca Meadows. However, the Third Circuit's ruling
does not limit itself to situations where only CERCLA-type statutes are
involved. All that is required is for the potentially responsible party to settle
'03 Consol. Edison Co. ofNY, Inc., 423 F.3d at 95.
104 Seneca Meadows, Inc. 427 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
105 Tinity Indus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 136.
1o6 Id. at 137.
107 id.
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its liability to the state for response costs.'a State statutes may contain
provisions for response costs similar to CERCLA, or states may have
regulatory and remediation statutes that create liability for response costs
unlike those found in CERCLA.'09 Courts should have wide latitude in
allowing parties to settle with states in these circumstances. By allowing
parties to settle state law claims, the states can promote a faster and more
economically efficient remediation and cleanup of hazardous material sites.
C. The Second Circuit has Shown a Willingness to Retreatfom its Rigid
Interpretation of CERCLA
The Second Circuit, based on Consolidated Edison and WR. Grace,
would likely oppose such a liberal reading of § 113(f)(3)(B). However, the
court signaled that it may be willing to retreat from its original position in
Consolidated Edison and WR. Grace. In 2010, the court decided Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.1 o In Niagara Mohawk, the
court stated that the plaintiff, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., was able to
file a contribution action after settling with the state Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC), even though the DEC did not have
express authority from the EPA to settle claims."'
The Niagara Mohawk court dealt with facts similar to Trinity
Industries. The potentially responsible party seeking to file a contribution
claim entered into a consent order with the state's DEC."2 The difference
between the two cases is that the consent order in Trinity Industries resolved
the party's state law liability, 11 whereas the consent order in Niagara
Mohawk settled state law and CERCLA liability.114
108 Id. at 136.
109 Id.
no Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d 112.
1 Id. at 127.
112 Id. at 125.
113 Trinity.Indus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 136.
114 Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 125.
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The Second Circuit clarified that its holding in Niagara Mohawk did
not substantially differ from Con Ed and WR. Grace.ns The court claimed
that in the preceding cases involving § 113(f)(3)(B), the consent orders
made no mention of CERCLA liability."' Niagara Mohawk's settlement
with the DEC clearly mentions CERCLA."' The consent order agrees to
provide Niagara Mohawk a "release and covenant not to sue.. .which
[DEC] has or may have pursuant to... State or Federal statutory or
common law involving or relating to investigative or remedial
activities..."1s
The consent order at issue in Niagara Mohawk differed from the
agreements found in Consolidated Edison, WR. Grace, and Trinity Industries.
The consent orders (or in Con Ed, the Voluntary Cleanup Agreement) at
issue in those cases resolved the liability of the potentially responsible party
with the state agency in charge rather than any liability contained within
CERCLA. Proponents of the Consolidated Edison rule would claim that
Trinity Industries' failure to settle CERCLA liability bars it from seeking
contribution. Alternatively, proponents of the Con Ed rule may claim the
consent order in Trinity Industries dealt with a CERCLA-based state
statute and therefore, a settlement under that statutory framework would be
the equivalent of a consent order that specifically released the potentially
responsible party from CERCLA liability.
However, the Trinity Industries rule is not so narrow, and a more
expansive interpretation is best suited to meet CERCLA's goals. While the
consent order in Trinity Industries did involve the state equivalents of
CERCLA, the Third Circuit's holding that a release from liability from the
state or federal governments demonstrates that the court was dealing with
the broader categories of liability mentioned by the Second Circuit in Con
Ed.
The EPA, in its brief to the court in Niagara Mohawk, explained that
the states "play a critical role in effectuating the purposes of CERCLA,"
115 Id.
116id
117 id
"' Id. at 126.
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because sites that meet the criteria for CERCLA vary greatly in types of
contamination and number in the multitudes."' The Third Circuit's
reading of § 113(f)(3)(B), and its allowance of state liability resolution to
trigger contribution, gives the states greater power and influence in cleanup
and efficient burden-distribution.
D. Textual and Legislative Support
In both Consolidated Edison and WR. Grace, the Second Circuit
focused on the text of CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B). This provision states that
a potentially responsible party must settle its liability for a "response
action."12 Noting that this phrase is unique to CERCLA, the Second
Circuit believed that a party must settle liability under CERCLA for
response actions.'21 The holding of Niagara Mohawk, while appearing to be
a retreat from this position, actually reinforced this rule. The Second
Circuit allowed a potentially responsible party to seek contribution once
that party is no longer liable under CERCLA.'22 While states can grant
releases of liability, as in Niagara Mohawk, they are still limited by the
requirement that they have the authority to release CERCLA liability.
If the EPA has not delegated this authority to the state, then the
potentially responsible party has less incentive to settle with the state.
Settling with the state for removal will not allow the party to begin a
contribution action, thereby relegating all response costs to the settling
party. This restriction provides less of an incentive for parties to settle, and
increases their willingness to be subject to a § 107(a) action. Only after a §
107(a) action commences can the party seek contribution.123 This line of
analysis runs contrary to CERCLA's intent to clean up hazardous waste
sites.
119 Id. at 126 (citing Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra
note 89)).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2014).
121 Consol. Edison Co. ofNY, Inc., 423 F.3d at 95.
122 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 126.
123 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165-66 (2004).
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In addition to statutory language, the court in Consolidated Edison
cited legislative materials in support of its position. Specifically, the court
pointed to a House Committee Report that accompanied the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.124 Consolidated Edison used
the legislative history of §113 of CERCLA to justify the statement that
"section 113 'clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly and
severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially
liable parties.""2 The Second Circuit read this report to mean that
settlements occurring "under CERCLA" are applicable to §§ 113(f)(1) and
113(f)(3)(B). 126
The court in Trinity Industries properly adopted the reading of
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B). Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not specifically
provide that liability under CERCLA is the criteria for contribution. The
liability the potentially responsible party is settling must only be for a
response action. CERCLA defines a "response" broadly by referencing
terms including: "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action. "127
CERCLA further states that a "removal action" equates to "the cleanup or
removal of hazardous substances from the environment."128 A party wishing
to settle should only be required to settle its liability with the state for its
responsibility in removing or cleaning up the hazardous waste.
The Third Circuit also correctly identified the court's
misinterpretation of the House Committee Report in Consolidated Edison.
The section used by the court in Consolidated Edison is in reference to §
113(f)(1) claims.129 It deals only with a civil action where a potentially
responsible party could be jointly or severally liable.13 o Only § 113(f)(1)
discusses civil actions under § 107(a) and joint and several liability.
12 Consol. Edison Co. ofN.Y, 423 F.3d at 96.
125 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (1985)).
126 id.
127 Brief for the United States as Amnicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, at 16, Trinity Indus., Inc.
v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2059) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25)
(2013)).
128 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2013).
129 Trinity Indus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 136.
13o Id.
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The House Committee Report supports the use of the rule in Trinity
Industries. The legislative history of § 113(f)(3)(B) shows that Congress
intended for §113 to encourage settlement and cleanup.13' A rule that
allows parties to settle state law claims would inevitably lead to faster
cleanups. It is likely that states would be more receptive and proactive in
seeking out potentially responsible parties to settle. CERCLA-qualified
sites that are in need of a response action lie within the boundaries of states.
Therefore, a state has a greater incentive than the federal government to
quickly settle liability with a party. The faster the party settles, the quicker
the state will see a cleanup of the site. The Report notes that private parties
who have the added incentive of a contribution action may be more willing
to settle.1 2
A settling party assumes all or some of the cleanup cost of the site.
The likelihood of reimbursement for that party's cost is a strong incentive
for a potentially responsible party to settle. It is likely that the party is liable
for the cleanup under state law, as well as federal law. This potential liability
creates an incentive for the party to proactively settle liability with the state
or federal government. If the party settles liability for response actions
before other parties, that party has the advantage of recouping some costs
through contribution actions. By allowing parties to settle response action
liability with state or federal agencies, the courts would be offering them a
broader opportunity to settle their liability, and recoup some costs from
other parties. This interpretation fits squarely within the language of the
statute, as § 133(f)(3)(B) disjunctively allows settlement with state or
federal agencies.
Courts should allow parties to begin contribution actions after settling
a broader array of state law liability claims regarding response actions
because this broader choice would increase settlement initiative through the
possibility of contribution, which would then produce more rapid response
actions. These rapid response actions lie at the heart of CERCLA's
purpose.
... See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (1985).
"' See id. at 80.
133 id.
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E. Trinity Industries Best Fits the Purpose and Goal of CERCLA
A rule that best fits within CERCLA's intent is one that allows
parties to seek contribution after settling state or federal response action
liability, without the prerequisite that the party settles CERCLA liability.
The threat posed by roughly 50,000 hazardous waste sites around the
country drove CERCLA's enactment. 134 However, relying on state and
federal bureaucracies may be time-consuming and expensive.13 Private
parties have a financial incentive to perform the site cleanup at a quicker
rate an*d more efficiently than state or federal governments. Private parties
that are responsible for site cleanup and remediation would likely spend less
for the cleanup as compared to similar actions controlled by state or federal
governments. Relying on the efficiency of private parties to spearhead
response actions is one of the primary goals of CERCLA's operation.
CERCLA seeks to "encourage private persons to assume the financial
responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others.""'
This language demonstrates that CERCLA intends for courts to allow
and encourage private parties to take responsibility for response actions.
Private parties that take the lead in site cleanup and remediation or removal
mitigate hazardous waste within a shorter timeframe than if conducted by
governmental agencies. Private parties are subject to competitive markets,
and the faster parties can clean a site and move on, the faster they can
channel their resources into other endeavors.
The rule that the Trinity Industries Court used is best suited to
encourage private parties to take responsibility. The state or federal
government undoubtedly would prefer to clean up CERCLA sites quickly.
The courts have acknowledged that states are the primary actors when it
134 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 6120 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-20, 1980
WL 12937..
1s See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 262-63 (discussing separate and dissenting views to
Superfund Amendments of 1985 describing inability of EPA to manage Superfund cleanup schedule
effectively and the tendency of people and bureaucracies to procrastinate when dealing with
controversial decisions).
13. Id. at 80.
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comes to CERCLA sites.'17 If a state intends to quickly and efficiently
remedy these sites, they will certainly benefit from private parties taking
initiative on these cleanups. For states to accomplish this goal, they would
be best served by entering into settlements or consent orders with parties.
By entering into a settlement, the state will mitigate the presence of
hazardous substances.' However, the problem for the state lies in
encouraging a party to settle rather than waiting for a recovery action to be
filed.
The rule in Trinity Industries that allowed potentially responsible
parties to seek contribution after settling response action liability is the
states' best incentive to offer A state will show that the party will be strictly
liable, and by settling, the party will be able to control its costs more
efficiently than through litigation. If parties have the added incentive of
seeking contribution, then states will have greater ability to encourage them
to begin cleanup. The states will not always have specific authorization
from the EPA to settle CERCLA liability, but they should not be
hampered by this limitation. A party that settles its response action liability
with a state will likely resolve its liability with CERCLA as well. However,
making it a condition precedent to contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B) that
the potentially responsible party must settle its CERCLA liability runs
counter to CERCLA's goal of "encourag[ing] private persons to assume the
financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from
others."13 1
While proponents of the rule in Consolidated Edison may argue that
settling only state law claims will leave potentially responsible parties open
to CERCLA liability down the road, the party must still settle for liability
relating to a response action. Response actions for states are similar to the
response actions required by CERCLA and, as in Trinity Industries, the
response actions that the party is settling with the state are identical to
CERCLA response actions." Therefore, the party would likely not be
"' Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 126.
138 H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. I, at 58-9.
'
3 9 Id. at 80.
0 Trinity Indus., Inc., 735 F.3d at 137.
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liable under CERCLA if it meets the obligation of the settlement or
consent order.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States was a nation of industrial polluters for much of the
twentieth century. It was only during the latter half of the century that the
government began to focus on protecting the natural and human
environment. In an effort to restore industrial sites to healthier and more
environmentally- friendly locations, the federal government enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act,
which provides several ways for the federal government to ensure cleanup of
these sites.
While case law is settled regarding CERCLA § 107(a) and §
113(f)(1), the Supreme Court has yet to address exactly when a potentially
responsible party settles its liability and can commence an action for
contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B). Until the seminal cases of Consolidated
Edison and WR. Grace, the federal circuit courts left this provision of
CERCLA largely untouched. These cases favor a strict interpretation of §
113(f)(3)(B) by allowing only potentially responsible parties that have
settled their CERCLA response action liability to initiate contribution
claims.141 District courts largely follow this interpretation of § 113(f)(3)(B).
However, Trinity Industries should move away from CERCLA-
specific settlement and toward a broader range of state law settlements
sufficient to create a cause of action for contribution. The disjunctive "or"
used in § 113(f)(3)(B) provides textual support for this conclusion in
CERCLA itself.'42 Further textual support comes from the very meaning of
"response action" having a broad interpretation. 143 The legislative history of
§ 113 further demonstrates that the statute and SARA amendments are
designed to encourage private parties to participate in response actions. A
141 See Consol. Edison Co. ofNY., Inc., 423 F.3d at 95; W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int'l,
Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2009).
142 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2012) (effective Jan. 15, 2013).
143 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (2012) (effective Jan. 15, 2013).
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reading of § 113(f)(3)(B) that allows potentially responsible parties to settle
with states for response actions increases the opportunities for potentially
responsible parties to settle and engage in a more efficient remediation
process. Finally, the reading of § 113(f)(3)(B) in Trinity Industries most
closely aligns with the original intent and purpose of CERCLA. Allowing
potentially responsible parties to settle with states for response costs not
directly under CERCLA increases incentives to settle, which in turn
increases response action timing.
CERCLA is a complex and important statute that affects every state
and results in the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars.'" A rule
that allows potentially responsible parties to settle response costs based on
state liability 'ensures continued adherence to CERCLA and its central
purpose of removing hazardous waste, and thus, the sites that negatively
affect the natural and human environment will be cleaned up more quickly
and efficiently.
1" See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 63-64.
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